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SMART CONTRACTS AND THE  
ILLUSION OF AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT 
 
Danielle D’Onfro*
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Proponents of so-called “smart contracts” have suggested that these 
innovations could be deployed in the consumer finance space, providing 
automated enforcement that would lessen—if not eliminate—the need for 
judicial remedies. But as this essay explores, there are three significant 
barriers to deploying smart contracts in the consumer finance context: 
consumer behavior, existing consumer protection laws, and the businesses 
whose own collection efforts would be hindered by competing creditors with 
access to automated remedies. These three barriers render perfectly 
automated enforcement all but impossible. Nevertheless, existing consumer 
protection law may accommodate smart contracts where the “smart” 
features of the contract can be swiftly turned off. But providing any such 
“off switch” may render these contracts only marginally more efficient than 
traditional contracts and they may still face opposition from consumers and 
third parties. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Smart contracts constitute one of the most promising but least understood 
corners of fintech. In their early days, the core idea of smart contracts was 
that “many kinds of contractual clauses . . . can be embedded in the hardware 
and software we deal with, in such a way as to make breach of contract 
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Bradley, Dan Epps, Dave Hoffman, Dalie Jimenez, Christopher Odinet, Rory Van Loo, and my 
colleagues at WashU for helpful conversations and comments. All errors are my own.     
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expensive (if desired, sometimes prohibitively so) for the breacher.”1 They 
were meant to be self-executing and self-enforcing agreements.2 Today, the 
definition of smart contract remains in flux as the technology, and concept, 
matures.3 In their simplest form, smart contracts look like vending 
machines: money goes in, product comes out with no third-party 
intermediation.4 Few applications are quite so simple. As J.G. Allen 
explains, many applications of smart contracts consist of “‘smart’ 
performance mechanisms ‘wrapped’ in a conventional contractual 
framework” and therefore conventional contract law.5 Automation is what 
makes the performance mechanism “smart” and this automation may extend 
through the enforcement mechanisms as well.6 At the vanguard, smart 
contracts are the core of cryptocurrency and tokens. Here, a significant part 
of the contract is the code itself.7 Their more immediate potential lies in less 
fanciful applications, for example, electronic payment systems. And if smart 
contracts can be used in the consumer finance space, they may mitigate the 
power imbalance in consumer finance by re-empowering consumers in 
contract negotiation.8 That is, smart elements may overtake even the front 
end of contracting—negotiations. But that technology is not yet ripe for 
widespread use.  
In the consumer finance space, the innovative potential of smart contracts 
has remained focused on automation of performance and enforcement. But 
even in this limited form, there are significant barriers to deploying smart 
contracts in consumer finance: the humans themselves, existing consumer 
protection laws, and businesses that have financial contracts with consumers 
but cannot deploy smart contracts. While small adjustments to existing 
consumer protection laws could unleash consumer smart contracts, it is 
 
 
1. Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets (1996), 
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinte-
school2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.html [https://perma.cc/U58l-94GS]. 
2. Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128, 147 (2017). 
3. J.G. Allen, Wrapped and Stacked: 'Smart Contracts' and the Interaction of Natural and 
Formal Language, 14 EURO REV. CONTRACT L. 307, 312 (2018). 
4. Id.; Jonathan G. Rohr, Smart Contracts and Traditional Contract Law, or: The Law of the 
Vending Machine, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 71, 79 (2019); Szabo, supra note 1.  
5. Allen, supra note 3 at 310, 313-314. 
6. Id. at 313. 
7. Id. 
8. Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 44–46 (2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/14
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neither clear that the benefits outweigh the risks nor that the political will to 
make these changes will exist in the near future. Moreover, compliance 
costs might quickly overrun the automation efficiencies of smart contracts. 
This Essay roughly sketches these external barriers to deploying smart 
contracts in the consumer finance space. Its aim is to encourage those 
developing consumer applications for smart contracts to think about the 
complexities of working with consumers early in the design process. My 
hope is that any product designed with compliance in mind is more likely 
to achieve meaningful compliance with consumer protection laws. Until 
smart contracts develop efficient methods for accommodating complex and 
customer-specific compliance obligations, their widespread deployment in 
consumer finance will remain a mere thought experiment. 
This Essay proceeds in four parts. It begins by briefly describing the 
potential role of smart contracts in the consumer finance space. It then 
describes how and why automated enforcement may be incompatible with 
consumer behavior. Next, it explores how a variety of consumer protection 
laws, most notably consumer bankruptcy law, render automated 
enforcement all but impossible. Finally, it explains why other businesses in 
the consumer finance space that cannot themselves deploy smart contracts 
may oppose any modifications to existing consumer protection laws 
facilitating automatic enforcement. 
 
I. THE PROMISE OF AUTOMATION  
IN CONSUMER FINANCIAL CONTRACTS 
 
The lifecycle of most contracts follows a few predictable stages: First, 
there is marketing to induce consumers to enter into the contract. Marketing 
makes certain terms especially visible to consumers.9 If consumers like the 
terms they see, they will consent to various obligations in exchange for 
some good or service. As commentators have noted for half a century, most 
consumer contracts—and therefore most contracts—are not the dickered 
agreements between equals that comprise most of a first-year contracts 
 
 
9. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003). 
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class.10 Instead, they are mostly standardized and preprinted forms that 
consumers must choose as a condition of purchasing a good or service.11 
Consumers rarely have the opportunity to customize these contracts to meet 
their needs.12 Pressing need for particular goods or services may even make 
marketing irrelevant in certain contexts. While there is some hope that smart 
contracts will reintroduce bargaining into consumer contracts,13 the most 
likely scenario in the short term is that smart contracts will incorporate 
company-friendly features like automated enforcement well before they 
incorporate consumer preferences.14 
Next, there is the performance of the contract—the actual exchange 
between the consumer and the company. Performance is the last step for 
many contracts, but when something does not go as planned, enforcement 
and collection follow.  
This Essay focuses on consumer financial contracts from performance 
through enforcement and collection. Collectively, I call this second part of 
a contract’s life “servicing.”15 Servicing, to borrow a term from mortgage 
 
 
10. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971) (“Standard form contracts probably account for 
more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made.”), Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: 
The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent Boilerplate: Foundations of Market Contracts, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1230 (2006) (explaining that contract terms “become part of the product, which is 
a unified set of disparate features: a battery, a forum selection clause, a microprocessor”), and Oren Bar-
Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 19 (2010)(explaining how unilateral 
modification rights tend to allow firms to propose changes that “increase their profits, regardless of the 
adverse consequences to consumers.”). 
11. Korobkin, supra note 9, at 1204; Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts 
about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943). 
12. Kessler, supra note 11, at 632. 
13. Fairfield, supra note 8, at 44. 
14. There is a rich literature cataloguing how consumer contract innovation has made contracts 
less friendly to consumers over time. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and 
Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 619–45 (2010) (providing a detailed history of the 
development and dissemination of arbitration clauses after Bank of America began the trend of 
unilateral, post-formation contract amendment); Bill Maurer, Late to the Party: Debt and Data, 20 SOC. 
ANTHROPOLOGY 474 (2012) (finding that consumer contracts—such as retail sales agreements—have 
become systemically more business-friendly over time); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, 
Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 
244 (2013) (finding that, between 2003 and 2010, arbitration clauses became standard in end-user license 
agreements). 
15. For a comprehensive explanation of servicing in the home mortgage context, see 
CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET, FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE SERVICING AND THE HIDDEN ARCHITECTURE OF 
HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 40–47 (2019). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/14
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lending, encompasses billing, payment processing, and collection.16 It is 
firm-side performance of the financial portion of a contract whose primary 
subject may or may not be financial.  
Servicing is typically not the product that the consumer believed 
themselves to be purchasing. As a result, particularly terrible servicing can 
impact a firm’s reputation over time, but it’s not clear that particularly good 
servicing offers any reputational advantage. Some of the worst servicing 
practices occur around default. Few consumers imagine that they are going 
to default on their contracts; therefore enforcement and collection 
provisions are not salient to them when they decide which contracts to form. 
Even if consumers are aware of their own risk of default, it is not obvious 
that they should choose their financial contracts based on enforcement and 
collection provisions instead of the provisions that directly bear on their risk 
of default. Servicing, then, is rarely subject to ameliorative market 
pressures. Instead, it is always a cost to be managed. It all but begs for 
automation. 
For many consumers, the myriad of contracts into which they enter every 
day ceases to be relevant almost as soon as they form the contract. As with 
the aforementioned vending machine, performance is nearly instantaneous. 
These consumers receive their desired product or service nearly 
simultaneously with formation and then have no need for ongoing 
interactions with the firm. That these consumers have no say over the 
servicing of the contract may not matter because they have no ongoing 
relationship with their counterparty.  
But when servicing extends over months and even years, the relationship 
between the consumer and the company may matter more. In financial 
contracts, consumers perform their contractual obligations by making 
payments. Some secured debt contracts entail additional obligations aimed 
at protecting the firm’s collateral. Occasionally, consumers may have other 
ongoing obligations to the firm, but few, if any, of these obligations are as 
important as making right-sized, on-time, payments. Even under the best 
economic conditions, time creates opportunities for complexities to arise in 
this ostensibly simple relationship.17 
 
 
16. Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3 (2011). 
17. See generally Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 1349 (2009) (exploring how innocent parties breach contracts and the morality of their breach). 
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Firm-side performance is even more complicated. Consider payment 
processing. Companies wishing to automate their payment processing 
systems will need to constrain customers’ payment options to those that 
work with their software. Although online transactions are becoming more 
common, no small number of consumers still makes payments by check or 
in cash. Looking at payments mailed by check reveals a labor-intensive 
process that is difficult to automate. Employees have to open envelopes, 
look for any special processing instructions in the envelope or on the 
check,18 decipher handwriting, match checks to accounts, cash the checks, 
then apply the payment against the account—accommodating special 
instructions, if any. Firms can simplify their processes by requiring 
consumers to make payments online but, as I will discuss below, they cannot 
entirely eliminate their capacity to process checks. 
Fortunately for firms, it is possible to mostly automate the payment 
application step. Most borrowers pay on time according to standardized 
contract terms that remain consistent across several, or even all, payments 
during the lifetime of the contract. Unfortunately, the segment of payments 
that does not qualify to simple automation is almost infinitely complicated. 
The opportunities for complexity are boundless but a few examples are 
illuminating: a customer in bankruptcy may be required to make payments 
through a trustee who will pass along payments only intermittently and only 
by check,19 a deceased customer may have heirs who are entitled to assume 
the contract but who lack simple things like account passwords to continue 
making uninterrupted payments.20 These more difficult payments are not 
rare, even if they are a usually small proportion of payments overall. 
Finally, enforcement is one of the least efficient steps in many contracts 
because it often requires the intervention of lawyers along with some 
combination of mediators, arbitrators, or courts. Each of these additional 
parties increases time and transaction costs while potentially reducing the 
 
 
18. For example, a customer on an installment plan may overpay to reduce their interest burden 
or even pay off the account early. Assuming that the terms of their contract permit prepayment, the firm 
must figure out how to apply the extra money according to both the terms of the contract and the 
customer’s instructions. This may occasionally require additional communication with the customer, 
and with that, additional labor and complexity. 
19. See infra Section III.B. 
20. Ron Lieber, A Shocking Death, a Financial Lesson and Help for Others, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 
11, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/your-money/estate-planning/shell-tell-you-its-time-
to-think-ahead.html [https://perma.cc/NRY8-LY8T]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/14
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predictability of both the disputed contract and future contracts. In all its 
forms, enforcement typically involves significant labor costs in addition to 
court costs and other litigation expenses. 
The inefficiencies of enforcement are particularly pronounced in 
consumer contracts where the expected return for either party is often 
dwarfed by fixed enforcement costs. Consider a consumer who owes an 
auto-lender $3,000 for her car. If she fails to make a payment, the labor and 
compliance costs of reminding her about the payment, repossessing the car, 
and then selling the car to a new buyer, may quickly consume the lender’s 
expected return on the contract. If the lender needs to go to court before 
repossessing the car, its expected return on its collection efforts will be less 
still. If the lender’s compliance processes fail to keep its efforts aligned with 
a matrix of local, state, and federal consumer protection laws, fines and 
other regulatory action may further reduce its return. 
Because enforcement is so inefficient, it is ripe for technological 
innovations. These innovations typically attempt to automate processes to 
reduce labor and compliance costs.21 At our hypothetical auto-lender, any 
employees calling the borrower would likely follow a script on their 
computer with pop-ups and other flags for key regulatory requirements. The 
auto-lender might even prefer robocalls because they cannot go off-script. 
An additional layer of software might ensure that calls only occur during 
regulatorily permissible hours and at permissible intervals. But there are still 
the issues of getting the car back from the consumer and dealing with any 
litigation that may occur. Those steps require people. 
Companies that contract with consumers for post-paid22 utilities, goods, 
and services all face some compliance and labor costs. Although these 
companies may not think of lending as their primary business, in economic 
terms they are lenders: they give the consumer something of value and are 
a creditor of the consumer until the consumer pays their bill. If the consumer 
fails to pay, the creditor must either write off the debt or incur collection 
and enforcement costs attempting to avoid the write-down. For example, 
 
 
21. See generally, Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. 
L. REV. 263 (2017) (describing how technological innovation in contacting attempts to overcome 
perceived inefficiencies). 
22. “Post-paid” refers to the order in which the consumer and the firm perform their contractual 
obligations. If the firm performs first and then bills the consumer, the contract is called “post-paid.” If 
the consumer pays the firm and only then the firm performs, then the contract is “pre-paid.” 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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gas companies need people or technology to recover late payments and 
often need humans on the ground if it intends to shut off service. And even 
if they are contractually entitled to cut service, most states constrain when 
they may do so in especially hot or cold weather and for vulnerable 
populations.23 Some lenders, like credit card companies, may face fewer 
humans-on-the-ground costs if they merely want to stop extending credit to 
a consumer, but if they want to garnish their former customers’ wages, they 
face complex consumer protection laws. 
In sum, enforcing consumer contracts is labor-intensive. Because debt 
collection is so heavily regulated, it is a detailed process in which any one 
misstep can create material legal risk.24 This risk comes from regulators and 
plaintiffs’ lawyers alike.25  
Smart contracts are one solution to the inefficiencies of enforcing 
consumer contracts. They seek to reduce friction—the opportunities for 
delay and error—in the enforcement and collection processes. The dominant 
theme emerging in the literature is the removal of intermediaries such as 
traditional financial institutions.26 As Joshua Fairfield explains, “[i]f 
financial transactions can be freed of banks as intermediaries, then contracts 
can be freed of courts as intermediaries.”27 The prototypical example here 
is of a car with an ignition interrupter that prevents it from starting when the 
consumer misses payments. 
In sum, one form of smart contract is a technological attempt to get the 
self-help rights that contract parties, especially creditors, have long 
wanted.28 The problem is that there are many good reasons why private law 
 
 
23. For example, Missouri’s Cold Weather Rule bars utilities from disconnecting service when 
the weather is forecast to be under 32 degrees in the next 24 hours and includes additional protections 
for older adults and disabled individuals. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240-13.055. Similar policies 
exist in most states. See Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), State Disconnection 
Policies, LIHEAP CLEARINGHOUSE, https://liheapch.acf.hhs.gov/Disconnect/disconnect.htm 
[https://perma.cc/F4KS-N7DG]. 
24. See infra Section III.B. 
25. See infra Section III.B. 
26. Fairfield, supra note 8, at 38; see also Szabo, supra note 1 (envisioning smart contracts as a 
potential solution for jurisdictional concerns). 
27. Fairfield, supra note 8, at 39. 
28. Some commentators have questioned whether the contracts underlying startup interrupters 
and vending machines are better conceived of as “contractware” instead of as truly smart contracts. See 
Allen, supra note 3 at 313-316; see also Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. 
L. TECH. REV. 305, 309-320 (2017) (tracing the definition of smart contracts). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/14
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rarely allows self-help and these reasons do not disappear merely because 
the self-help mechanism is “smart.” That is, the mechanism for removing 
intermediaries and courts does not matter when those intermediaries and 
courts reflect conscious policy choices that promote both consumer 
protection and fairness among creditors.  
Furthermore, much of the friction introduced by these intermediaries and 
courts is mandatory because it reflects a pro-consumer policy.29 As such, it 
is difficult to see the political case for reducing, much less eliminating, this 
friction. This is not to say that the current levels of friction are optimal, but 
rather to say that no one has yet made a persuasive argument for eliminating 
this friction.  
 
II. THE IRREDUCIBLE HUMANS OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
 
The main source of the friction in consumer contracts is the consumers 
themselves. Both consumers and regulators expect contract counterparties 
in consumer financial contracts to be humans. This assumption implies that 
consumers and regulators expect the parties to be imperfect and then expect 
flexibility around those imperfections.30 There is no reason to think that this 
expectation can or should change. After all, smart contracts may make 
certain interactions between parties more efficient by reducing the role of 
humans in the relationship, but they cannot make consumers less human. 
The essential problem here is that no one actually wants perfect 
enforcement of contracts,31 especially not consumer financial contracts. 
 
 
29. See infra Section III.B. 
30. One vivid manifestation of this phenomenon is the debate around home mortgage 
modifications following the Great Recession. Putting aside cases in which there were allegations of 
lender misbehavior, there were widespread demand for consumer relief even where there could be little 
dispute that many borrowers had breached their contractual obligations. See e.g., Peter S. Goodman, 
U.S. Will Push Mortgage Firms to Reduce More Loan Payments, N.Y. TIMES (November 28, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/29/business/economy/29modify.html [https://perma.cc/SA2K-
9KG7] (explaining that officials in the Obama administration were pressuring mortgage companies to 
do more to help struggling borrowers); Deborah Solomon and Robin Sidel, Treasury Looks to Aid 
“Underwater” Mortgages, WALL ST. J. (February 14, 2009), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123457111387586375 [https://perma.cc/2V67-VVMD] (explaining 
that the Treasury Department was considering ten different proposals to aid borrowers). 
31. See generally Irma S. Russell, Reinventing the Deal: A Sequential Approach to Analyzing 
Claims for Enforcement of Modified Sales Contracts, 53 FLA. L. REV. 49 (2001) (analyzing when efforts 
to modify a contract should in fact supersede the original terms).  
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Consumers want some flexibility around breach—wiggle room before 
breach leads to enforcement.32 They want exceptions when circumstances 
beyond their control put them in breach of their contracts. Many companies 
want to be able to make these exceptions for several reasons, not the least 
of which is to avoid the kind of bad media coverage that makes them seem 
heartless and even evil. Without flexibility in how they enforce individual 
contracts, companies court more intrusive regulation of their business if 
their practices generate sufficient bad media coverage or calls for 
intervention. 
The reasons consumers occasionally want flexibility in enforcement are 
obvious. Even the most responsible consumer will occasionally face 
unavoidable obstacles to making timely payments. Back when consumers 
made payments by check, postal delays and bad weather might occasionally 
delay a payment. Now, internet and power outages sometimes prevent 
consumers from meeting their commitments on time. And of course, there 
is always the risk that some error either at the consumer’s financial 
institution or at the company receiving the payment will derail an otherwise 
timely payment. In any of these cases, the consumer might contact customer 
service and seek a forbearance. Depending on the situation, they may expect 
to receive a forbearance and attempt to punish the company by publicizing 
their situation or contacting regulators if they do not receive it. In other 
words, failing to meet customer expectations for flexibility in enforcement 
may increase a company’s reputational and regulatory risk.33 
The reasons companies might want flexibility in enforcement are more 
nuanced. Flexibility may be good for business insofar as it is an opportunity 
to distinguish themselves from their peers or to build customer loyalty. But 
the whole point of smart contracts is that there are not humans on both sides 
of the contract, meaning that there is no one on the company side to exercise 
the kind of discretion consumers sometimes seek. Smart contracts could 
 
 
32. These calls from consumers to customer service are functionally the same as out-of-court 
negotiations that occur when sophisticated contracting parties have a dispute. Since it is mutually 
preferable and more efficient to handle many disputes informally, contracting parties bring 
comparatively few disputes to court. Scholz, supra note 2, at 149. 
33. One way for unmet customer expectations to increase regulatory oversight is through public 
customer complaint systems. See Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall & Sonia Steinway, Skeletons in the Database: 
An Early Analysis of the CFPB's Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 343, 351-52 
(2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/14
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allow for some kind of enforcement override, but this kind of feature adds 
complexity and risk to the technology.34 Returning to the example of the car 
with an ignition interrupter, imagine the wrath of a customer who cannot 
make an online payment due to a power outage, who receives assurances 
that their car will start tomorrow but nevertheless finds their car disabled 
because the customer service agent making the assurance could not or did 
not override the automatic enforcement in time. The potential for 
complexity in any individual’s life makes perfectly automated enforcement 
unappealing. 
 
III. THE ILLUSION OF PERFECT ENFORCEABILITY 
 
The previous section explained why consumer behavior is unlikely to 
support full automation. This section explores the risks that come with 
attempts to automate despite human behavior. 
 
A. Reputation Risk 
 
The case of the ignition interrupter is one of many scenarios in which 
automated enforcement may increase a contract’s reputational risk to a 
company. A company using smart contracts may suffer reputational 
consequences if the automated enforcement kicks in when the consumer is 
especially vulnerable, even if the terms of the contract allow enforcement at 
that moment. The potential examples here are legion but the ignition 
interrupter example is plenty illuminating. Imagine that the consumer 
believes that she made the payment and now finds herself in labor with a 
car that won’t start. The cable news coverage writes itself.  
The same is potentially true for the smart TV that won’t turn on without 
payment. Imagine a California family that does not receive a fire evacuation 
warning in time because it did not make its technology payments. 
Additional technology, perhaps incentivized by regulation, may mitigate 
some of these problems. Just as any cell phone can reach 911 even if it lacks 
a post-paid plan or pre-paid minutes,35 so too any television or radio might 
 
 
34. See infra Section III.B. 
35. 911 Wireless Services, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/911-wireless-services [https://perma.cc/2PY2-EQQL]. 
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transmit emergency broadcasts even if it is disabled due to contract 
enforcement. But these exceptions to enforcement add complexity to a 
system that exists to reduce complexity. These complexities reduce the 
advantage of using a smart contract. 
Indeed, prior scholarship has explained that this reputational risk makes 
debt more valuable in the hands of smaller, more reputation-immune 
companies.36 Reputation-sensitive companies have to accept less perfect 
enforcement of their contracts to protect their reputations. Nameless debt 
collectors face no such constraints.37 
Companies that aggressively enforce their consumer contracts may attract 
not only negative publicity but also additional regulatory oversight. 
Specifically, companies that fail to build exceptions procedures into their 
automated enforcement mechanisms risk running afoul of various consumer 
protection laws or inviting new laws into their industry.38 Even where they 
do not fail to meet particular regulatory requirements, consistently failing to 
meet customer expectations invites scrutiny.39 
While the U.S. legal system generally promotes efficient contract 
enforcement, even at the periodic expense of consumer welfare, there are 
exceptions to this policy. These exceptions tend to focus on particularly 
vulnerable consumers, concerns for third parties, and, in the case of 
consumer bankruptcy, the idea that periodically giving some consumers a 
fresh start is better for the economy than perfect enforcement of consumer 
obligations.40 Smart contracts’ promise of automated enforcement runs 
squarely into these policies. For example, many states require that landlords 
 
 
36. Dalie Jimenez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41, 52 (2015); Ronald 
J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 391; 
Jeff Sovern & Kate E. Walton, Are Validation Notices Valid? An Empirical Evaluation of Consumer 
Understanding of Debt Collection Validation Notices, 70 SMU L. REV. 63, 66 (2017). 
37. Jimenez, supra note 36; Mann, supra note 36; Sovern & Walton, supra note 36. 
38. For example, the Home Affordable Modification Program was a federal framework designed 
to help mortgage borrowers keep their homes by modifying their mortgage, ideally to make the monthly 
payments more affordable. While the program was voluntary for servicers, many participated even 
though it imposed significant compliance costs on them and exposed them to additional liability. Harry 
N. Arger & Brett J. Natarelli, Support for Dismissal of State Law Based HAMP TPP Cases, BUS. L. 
TODAY (Jan. 2013), at 1. 
39. See Ayres et al., supra note 33. 
40. See generally Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A 
Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49 (1986) (surveying the 
theoretical justifications for debt forgiveness in bankruptcy). 
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give tenants notice before evicting them from their apartments, even when 
the tenant fails to pay rent.41 Putting smart locks on doors so that they only 
open when a tenant pay rent does not change this concern. Similarly, most 
states limit when utility companies can shut off the heat, because the states’ 
concern for the safety of their citizens in extreme weather outweighs their 
concern for efficient contracting.42 Installing smart valves on water mains 
or smart switches on electrical lines is not going to change these concerns. 
Breach of peace may be one of the few enforcement concerns that smart 
contracting can solve. Breach of peace is a limitation on lenders’ right to 
repossess collateral themselves.43 This limitation protects neighbors from 
nuisance and potential violence.44 If lenders cannot repossess their collateral 
without disturbing the neighbors, they must use law enforcement to collect 
their collateral.45 Involving the sheriff will impose additional costs, delay, 
and offers no guarantee that the lender will receive the property.46  
The goals of repossession against consumers may be less about actually 
taking possession of the collateral to resell it and more about incentivizing 
the consumer to pay the debt. Indeed, by the time the lender pays the 
repossession costs, there may be little, if any, value left in the item 
repossessed.47 Self-enforcing contracts solve this problem by reducing or 
eliminating the need to repossess collateral provided that they can make the 
collateral’s usefulness conditional on payment. Still, it is unclear if this 
benefit outweighs the increased reputational risk. 
 
 
 
41. E.g., Wilson v. Kavanaugh, 941 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a 
landlord wrongfully evicts a tenant when it changes the locks prior to giving the tenant 30 days’ notice 
as required by statute). 
42. See supra note 23. 
43. Adam B. Badawi, Self-Help and the Rules of Engagement, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 14-17 
(2012). 
44. Id. at 13-14. 
45. Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 151 (Minn. 1978) (sanctioning a landlord for changing the 
locks on commercial property, even though the tenant was absent, out of concern that changing locks 
may lead to a breach of peace). 
46. The reasons why collections can and do fall short are legion but it is not uncommon for the 
sheriff to be unable to reclaim the property subject to judgment. While amercement offers remedy 
against sheriffs who unreasonably fail to secure property for creditors, it is a “seldom used remedy.” 
Meyers v. Hadsell Chem. Processing, LLC, No. 18AP-387, 2019 Ohio App. LEXIS 3068, *18, *28 
(Ohio Ct. App. July 23, 2019) (explaining the history of amercement). 
47. See Badawi, supra note 43, at 9-12 (modeling when creditors are likely to use self-help). 
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B. Compliance Risk 
 
While smart contracts can reduce some companies’ compliance costs, 
they do not inherently exempt companies from consumer protection statutes 
and other applicable contract doctrines.48 Many consumer protection 
doctrines may ultimately prove compatible with automation, but others will 
not. The challenge for any system that purports to automate enforcement is 
to efficiently accommodate all of the regulatory exceptions to the 
enforcement of private contracts. 
The protections that are least likely to be compatible with automation are 
those that provide consumers with individual-specific exceptions to their 
contractual obligations. Consumer bankruptcy and its state-law analogues 
are the largest obstacles, but there are legions of similar protections 
scattered through federal, state, and even local law. In addition to the utility 
disconnection laws mentioned above,49 consider provisions such as the 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA),50 which describes itself as 
enabling servicemembers to “devote their entire energy to the defense needs 
of the Nation”51 by “provid[ing] for the temporary suspension of judicial 
and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect 
the civil rights of servicemembers during their military service.”52 The act 
caps the interest rate on certain debt at six percent53 while blocking some 
repossessions,54 non-judicial foreclosures,55 and lease terminations.56 The 
policy concern animating these protections—encouraging servicemembers 
to “devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation”57—does 
not change merely because the servicemembers’ contracts purport to be 
 
 
48. For example, there is no reason to think that smart contracts are immune from challenge 
based on doctrines such as mistake or impossibility. Similarly, parties may allege fraud and its kin to 
undo them.  
49. See supra note 23. 
50. 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901–4043 (2012). 
51. Id. § 3902(1). 
52. Id. § 3902(2). 
53. Id. § 3937. 
54. Id. § 3952. 
55. Id. § 3953. 
56. Id. § 3955. 
57. Id. § 3902(1). 
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“smart.” It is therefore difficult to see any principled justification for 
exempting smart contracts from these protections. 
The only way that a smart contract can accommodate these protections is 
if it is possible to modify it post-formation to accommodate the applicable 
protections.58 Although originally touted for their immutability, modern 
iterations of smart contracts often have some provision for post-formation 
modification, even if that means scrapping the contract for a new, amended 
contract.59 The difference between modifying the sophisticated smart 
contracts used among businesses in financial transactions and those used in 
consumer transactions is that many of the post-formation modifications 
needed in the consumer context will be highly individualized. Consumers 
or their agents will need some way to trigger the modification process 
themselves. At the present, that trigger is likely another human who can 
collect, verify, and process the consumers’ eligibility for protection. In this 
scenario, the smart part of the contract provides little value and may indeed 
increase costs depending on the complexity of the modification process.  
Consumer bankruptcy is even more antithetical to automation than the 
SCRA. When consumers file for bankruptcy, an automatic stay stops all 
collection action against the consumer notwithstanding any company’s 
contractual right to self-help or other enforcement.60 For typical post-paid 
contracts, this means that companies must have a timely way to receive 
notifications of bankruptcy proceedings and to stop their collections 
activities. For most companies, this involves having customer service 
agents, automated or human, place some kind of hold on the consumers’ file 
in the company’s system of record.61 Companies who fail to respond in time 
and nevertheless proceed with dunning letters, calls, or other collection 
activity face sanctions.62 
One way a company using smart contracts can reduce their risk of 
violating bankruptcy and other consumer protection rules is to turn their 
contracts into pre-paid systems. So in the ignition interrupter scenario, 
 
 
58. See Raskin, supra note 28, at 327 (explaining options to for modifying smart contracts to 
accommodate ex-post compliance obligations). 
59. Shaahan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick, Coin Operated 
Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 630 (2019). 
60. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
61. See Jimenez, supra note 36, at 49–55 (explaining systems of record). 
62. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2012). 
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imagine that buying a car becomes like purchasing a cell phone on a pre-
paid contract: the physical car and the driving “minutes”—or “miles”—are 
purchased via separate transactions. Companies could sell the car at a 
discounted price, then make up the difference by selling the right to drive 
the car separately.63 One can do the same for televisions and all kinds of 
other consumer goods. While this model would be a fundamental change to 
what it means to “own” something, it already exists for many products. For 
example, consumers purchase computer hardware outright, but this 
hardware is unusable without a license for an operating system, productivity 
software and whatever else the consumer may need.64 
This model is easy to implement where there is no residual value in the 
physical item held by the consumer, but harder to implement where the 
company might want the item back. Bankruptcy, and the underlying law of 
secured transactions, strictly polices efforts to re-characterize loans for the 
purchases of goods as leases, licenses, or other transactions.65 At the very 
least, proving in court that transactions that look like financial contracts are 
actually something other than a financial contract because of the smart 
contract structure is another cost to overcome. 
Even where companies manage to comply with the automatic stay 
notwithstanding the automatic enforcement provisions in their contracts, the 
customer-specific servicing requirements of bankruptcy are likely to make 
accounts in bankruptcy at least partially incompatible with automation. For 
example, in some jurisdictions, a consumer who is making payments under 
a Chapter 13 plan must make those payments first to their trustee who then 
 
 
63. Tesla’s business model arguably does this already. All of the company’s Model S and Model 
X electric vehicles include the same battery, but the company sells some models at a discount and uses 
software to restrict the range of those models. During Hurricane Irma, it pushed out a software update 
which temporarily lifted the range restriction on the lower priced models. Brian Fung, As Hurricane 
Irma Bore Down, Tesla Gave Some Florida Drivers More Battery Juice. Here’s why that’s a Big Deal, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2017/09/11/as-
hurricane-irma-bore-down-tesla-gave-some-florida-drivers-more-battery-juice-heres-why-thats-a-big-
deal/ [https://perma.cc/LL64-7ZF8]. 
64. See AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL 
PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 57–59 (2016) (discussing the fine line between ownership and 
licenses). 
65. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney Jr, When Is a Dog’s Tail Not a Leg?: A Property-
Based Methodology for Distinguishing Sales of Receivables from Security Interests That Secure an 
Obligation, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1029, 1040–43 (2014) (explaining how the law looks at the substance of 
a transaction to determine whether it is a sale or something else). 
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forwards them onto the company after taking a cut themselves.66 Because 
of the stay and the binding terms of the plan, the company cannot penalize 
the customer if it receives the payments late from the trustee or in a format 
that contradicts how the contract between the customer and the company 
dictates that the customer must make payments.67 Complying with the 
servicing rules for accounts in bankruptcy has proven to be a significant 
problem for financial institutions.68 The risk for companies that 
intentionally lack this personnel is potentially greater. 
Creative contracting and technological self-help cannot squeeze court-
administered consumer protection out of the system. For example, the 
bankruptcy code itself renders unenforceable any contractual provision that 
purports to limit the debtor’s rights to bankruptcy protection.69 Similarly, 
most jurisdictions require some kind of court proceeding before creditors 
can take possession of real property.70 These proceedings ensure oversight 
of the relationship between consumers and their counterparties. In some 
cases, notably bankruptcy71 and housing courts,72 even arbitration clauses 
 
 
66. See Gordon Bermant & Jean Braucher, Making Post-Petition Mortgage Payments Inside 
Chapter 13 Plans: Facts, Law, Policy, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 261 (2006) (analyzing the merits of these 
so-called “conduit payments”). 
67. Indeed, some courts have operating orders instructing how trustees should handle conduit 
payments notwithstanding the specific contractual obligations of the borrower. See, e.g., In re Conduit 
Mortgage Payments in Chapter 13 Cases Assigned to Judge Taites and Judge Duncan, Operating Order 
16-02 (revised) (Bankr. D.S.C. Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.scb.uscourts.gov/pdf/oporder/opor16-02.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V4PF-3ZJU]. 
68. See e.g., Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 9:17-cv-80495 
(S.D. Fla. April 20, 2017) (detailing Ocwen’s difficulty in adapting its servicing technology to the 
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code); see also Craig Rule & Heather McGivern, Chapter 13 Trustee 
Pay-All/Conduit Jurisdictions: Some Issues, Challenges, and Pointers, USFN (Nov. 7, 2016), 
https://www.usfn.org/blogpost/1296766/260680/Chapter-13-Trustee-Pay-All-Conduit-Jurisdictions-
Some-Issues-Challenges-and-Pointers [https://perma.cc/WM2J-ZJ9W] (detailing some of the 
challenges of Chapter 13 compliance). 
69. 11 U.S.C. §365(e)(1) (2012). 
70. See Badawi, supra note 45, at 23-24 (exploring how nearly every jurisdiction has eliminated 
self-help for the repossession of real property, although many still allow it under certain conditions for 
the repossession of personal property). 
71. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that bankruptcy 
courts may refuse to send so-called “core” claims to arbitration where doing so would “jeopardize the 
important purposes that the automatic stay serves: providing debtors with a fresh start, protecting the 
assets of the estate, and allowing the bankruptcy court to centralize disputes concerning the estate”). 
72. See, e.g., Washington Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973, WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 
59.18.320(1)(b)(ii) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Legis. Sess.) (prohibiting arbitration in actions for 
unlawful detainer). 
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cannot divert cases away from the specialized tribunal. For smart contracts 
to avoid these tribunals, they would need some kind of special legislation 
that prioritized the efficiency of automatic enforcement over the protective 
processes of existing consumer protection law. While it is possible that 
automated enforcement will lower consumers’ costs and expand access, it 
is far from obvious that these arguments outweigh the policies behind 
consumer protection. In sum, consumer protection laws will make it 
extremely difficult to remove humans from consumer contracts. While 
smart contracts may evolve to be more modifiable,73 the very need to modify 
smart contracts to accommodate compliance mandates reduces their 
comparative advantage over traditional contracts. 
  
IV. THIRD-PARTY HARM 
 
In addition to the challenging optics of exempting new technology from 
existing consumer protection laws, political economy poses a further 
challenge. The entities who cannot move their consumer contracts onto self-
enforcing smart contracts—say the heating company in the dead of winter—
are unlikely to sit quietly and watch newcomers jump them in the race for 
the consumers’ assets. 
In a world in which some significant group of consumers does not have 
sufficient liquid assets to make all of their payments on time every month,74 
smart contracts can give those companies using them a preference over the 
consumer’s other obligations. A preference is when a borrower pays a 
creditor ahead of other creditors, thereby increasing the risk that the 
 
 
73. See Bill Marino & Ari Juels, Setting Standards for Altering and Undoing Smart Contracts, 
in RULE TECHNOLOGIES 151 (Jose Julio Alferes, Leopoldo Bertossi, Guido Governatori, Paul Fodor, &  
Dumitro Roman eds., Springer Int'l Publ'g Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 9718, 2016) 
(explaining how contract modifications occur on Ethereum). 
74. One manifestation of the mismatch between income and obligations in American households 
is the rate at which Americans turn to payday loans and other kinds of short-term, high-interest credit to 
make ends meet. In 2016, the Pew Charitable Trusts estimated that 12 million American turn to payday 
loans each year. Payday Loan Facts and the CFPB's Impact, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 14, 2016), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2016/01/payday-loan-facts-and-the-
cfpbs-impact [https://perma.cc/9QJS-BBTQ]; see also Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social 
Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093 (2019) (exploring how easy access to credit “ease[s] the reality of a 
bleak financial future” for middle class Americans while serving as one of the main sources of social 
provision for lower income families). 
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borrower will not pay the other creditors.75 For example, if failure to make 
a car payment means that the car will not start today, a rational consumer 
will prefer to pay their auto-lender before they pay other creditors including 
credit card issuers, landlords, and utilities. Assuming that the consumer 
cannot possibly pay all of their obligations, this payment shifting means that 
other creditors are more likely to have to absorb a loss. In other words, smart 
contracts shift risk onto other creditors.76  
To be sure, many creditors already have remedies that shift risk onto 
consumers’ other creditors. Landlords can begin eviction proceedings, 
utilities can cut off services, credit-card issuers can deny new charges, and 
traditional auto-lenders can repossess cars. Rational consumers may order 
their payments to avoid these remedies, even where that means failing to 
pay other creditors to whom their obligations are no less valid. The 
difference between these remedies and smart contracts is timing. With smart 
contracts, as soon as the consumer neglects a payment, automatic 
enforcement occurs. Few other creditors can do the same,77 even when they 
are entitled to self-help under applicable law. 
The timing advantage of smart contracts increases the risk that they will 
receive a preference over other creditors because some forms of self-help 
against consumers limit those consumers’ ability to earn future income. 
Notably, consumers who cannot drive to work on time cannot earn the 
money they need to make their next payment. Consumers whose water shuts 
off automatically may not be able to shower enough to keep some jobs. 
In other words, the inefficiency in the current system of consumer 
contract enforcement gives consumers wiggle room on their payments. 
Although it makes perfect enforcement impossible, it may actually increase 
enforcement overall by stalling the collateral consequences of enforcement. 
 
 
75. This risk that how borrowers time their payments to particular creditors can create unfairness 
between creditors is one reason the Bankruptcy Code makes certain transfers on the eve of bankruptcy 
voidable. See 11 U.S.C. § 547; see also Thomas H. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY 
LAW 125 (1986) (describing preference law as a “solution” to “the common pool problem that results 
from strategic planning in the prebankruptcy period”). 
76. This risk shifting parallels the risk shifting that occurs when borrowers acquire secured debt 
and that has made secured creditors’ rights controversial. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured 
Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994). 
77. See Rebecca Crootof, The Internet of Torts: Expanding Civil Liability Standards to Address 
Corporate Remote Interference, 69 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 44-47) (on file with 
author) (explaining the risks of enforcement through the internet of things). 
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In this way, smart contracts may be a boon for companies that can use them, 
but value destroying for companies that cannot. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is difficult to see the strategic advantage of smart contracts in consumer 
finance unless the purpose of those contracts is to short-circuit existing 
consumer protection safeguards. Although other recent trends in consumer 
finance have not been uniformly consumer-friendly, I am skeptical that 
smart contracts will succeed in such a mission. Consumer protection law is 
a myriad of overlapping obligations from several layers of regulators. Even 
if smart contracts could win preferential treatment from one regulator, that 
does not solve their problems elsewhere. The volume of consumer 
protection laws, and their tendency to change over time, all but eliminates 
the prospect of coding smart contracts for perfect compliance ex-ante. 
Furthermore, there is good reason to think that entrenched industries that 
are unable to use smart contracts will oppose efforts to exempt smart 
contracts from the kinds of consumer protection statutes with which they 
must contend.  
If there is any room for smart contracts in the consumer finance space, 
this Essay has shown that those contracts will need to be modifiable ex-post. 
These modifications will need to be easily implemented by customer service 
representatives interacting with humans. It remains to be seen whether smart 
contracts can accommodate this kind of modification process and still be 
more efficient than traditional contracts. 
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